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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL H. POWELL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
s. TONY COX, Director 
Driver License Division 
Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 16660 
Since appellant is willing to submit this matter on 
the briefs of appellant and respondent, appellant submits 
this brief in reply to respondent's Brief on Appeal. 
REPLY 
There is no questions that appellant supplied the 
testing officer with a cylinder full of breath air and the 
uncontroverted evidence is: 
"Q. And Officer Curtis never turned to analyze the 
55 c.c.'s that was provided? 
A. No, he did not?" (R 29) 
41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated grants to a peace officer 
the right to select the testing mechanism to be used. Nowhere 
in that section of the code nor in 41-6-44.lO(b) Utah Code 
Annotated is the manner of administering a breathalyzer test 
outlined by our legislature. 
It is apparent from all citations that a sample was 
-1-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
obtained in sufficient quantity to analyze although this 
sample may not have met with the subjective desires of the 
arresting officer, it was he whose chose not to analyze 
the sample. 
Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 94 Cal, Rptr. 
182, 185 (Cal. App.-1971) is not applicable as Utah differs 
from California in that only a single test is required of a 
validly arrested driver who " ... shall be deemed to have 
given his consent to a chemical test . . " (Emphasis added.) 
-,,c 
DATED this l.fJ__ day of January, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
copy of the foregoing to Bruce, M. Hale, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on thl! 
/(), day of January, 1980. 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TJ[CJ;!AS T. THOMPSON and 
LULA TllO'.'lPSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
Q. KEITH SMITH and 
ROSSLYN SMITH, his wife, 
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 16662 
This is an action between Sellers (Plaintiffs-
Respondents) and Purchasers (Defendants-Appellants) of a 
business, including certain real estate upon which the 
business was located. 
The Sellers sought, alternatively, to reform or 
rescind the sale agreement, while the Purchasers sought its 
specific enforcement. The dispute centered around the 
interest provision of the contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following trial below, the Court entered a decree 
of reformation in favor of the Plaintiff-sellers and against 
the Defendant-purchasers. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOllCllT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to overturn the decree of reform-
at ion, on the grounds that the judt;ment entered Has c,)ntrary 
to law and wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
In December, 1976, the parties entered into a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale by Plaintiffs to 
Defendants of a cafe, store and motel in Virgin, Utah. The 
contract provided for a sale price of $51,000, payable by a 
$22,000 initial deposit and monthly $200.00 installments, 
said installments applying to interest accruing at 87, per 
annum and then to principal. 
Defendants could not sell their home and certain 
personal pro?erty to fund the substantial down payment, and 
sought to renegotiate the contract. The parties agreed on a 
reduction in the down payment provided that the Defendant-
purchasers would assume obligations of the contract by which 
Sellers Here themselves purchasing the business (Severson 
contract). At trial the parties disputed the amount which 
was to be paid down but all admitted a reduction was agrerd 
upon. 
In March, 1977, the parties ·went to a title com-
pany and met with Mr. Allan Carter. They inforc:ied him of 
the terms of the transaction and requested he prepare the 
necessary documents. He informed them it \vould tCJ.l:e a very, 
1Except where specific:=il ly no:-:ed, facts are s taterl as fo 1-''"1 
by the 101-1er couc:t. 
2 
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very lonz time to pay the contract off due to the large 
prlncipCll balance and small monthly payments. T 22:5-10. 
The parties left the title company. Mr. Carter and Mr. 
Smith later discussed the matter. Mr. Smith instructed Mr. 
Carter to prepare the contract to provide for interest on 
the unpaid balance at 8% per annum, through the first year 
only, with no interest thereafter. Only 12 years of 
payments would be required. 
Mr. Carter's uncontradicted testimony was that he 
contacted Mr. Thompson to verify the acceptability of this 
change, and that Hr. Thompson did not object. T 74:27 -
75:17; see T 39:14 - 40:8 
The parties met March 29, 1977, in a bank in 
Hurricane, Utah, to execute the papers. The bank was to act 
as escrow agent. 
The closing was not uneventful. There was argument 
and discussion. Defendant testified the meeting was one and 
one-half to two hours in length. The contract (or at least 
parts related to interest and down payment) was read by the 
bank officer to the Sellers. T Lf2:23 - 43:18; 64:6-14. The 
bank officer attenpted to call Nr. Carter to question him 
about the contract but was unable to reach him. T 26:30 -
27:19. There was heated discussion of the reduced down 
payment and interest rate. Finally Hrs. Thompson said 
"Let's sign it; we've been on this for so many months; lets 
get it over with; let us be done with it." T 30:1-3; 
3 
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47:16-18; 96:15-16. The parties executed the document and 
left the bank. 
A few days later the Thompsons requested the tit],, 
company draw up another contract providing for int•~rest 
throughout the term of the contract, at 8% per annul'.l. Uhen 
Smjths refused to sign it, suit was filed. 
Purchaser-appellants contended at trial and now 
contend that the only interpretation o E the evidence is that 
the seller-respondents knew the nature of the document they 
signed, did so freely and voluntarily and should not now be 
al lowed to renege, rewriting the agreement in their favor. 
POINT I 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECREE FOR REFORMATION IJAS 
CONTRARY TO LAW, BEING BASED UPON 
A FINDING OF "NO MEETING OF THE 
MINDS." 
The findings of the Court below reflect that the 
language of the contract was reformed because the Court felt 
there was no "meeting of the TTlinds" on the interest term. 
17. That the agreement entered ini:o by and between 
the parties on March 29, 1977 did not coritain the 
agreement bi::tween the pa.rties as it pertained to. 
the payment of interest and the parties had prev1011s 
had a meeting of minds on the p.:tyment of interest ~ 
in the amount of 8 percent per annum simple interesc 
18. That because of the same, there was no~ 
of the minds between the parties in the agreement 
of March 29, 1977 wherein the Plaintiffs were 
Sellers and the Defendants w2re Buyers of the . 
above described real property regnrcling the p:iyn' 1 ' 
of interest. 
!; 
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19. That the actual 1';eeting of the minds between 
the parties was to the effect that interest would 
be paid on the outstanding balance of said contract 
at the rate of 8 percent per annum simple interest 
from the date of execution of the same until the 
outstanding principal balance plue interest was 
paid in full, and that each payment would be 
applied first to the payment of accrued interest 
and second to the reduction of principal. 
Findings of Fact, H 17-19 (emphasis added) 
While it is true that reformation is granted in 
cases in which there has been no meeting of minds on the 
written document, that lack alone will not justify reforma-
tion. The lack of meeting of minds is a result of the specific 
circumstances which justify reformation. But a lack of 
meeting of minds may also result from mere unilateral mistake 
which does not justify reformation. Reformation will only 
be granted in a case of mutual mistake or in a case of 
unilateral mistake brought about by fraud or concealment. 
There are two basic grounds for the reformation of 
\Yritten instruments which do not correctly state 
and embody the intention and pre-existing agreement 
of the parties to the instrument, namely, (1) 
mutual mistake of the parties and (2) ignorance or 
mistake of the complaining party coupled with or 
induced by the fraud or inequitable conduct of the 
other or remaining parties. 66 Am.Jur. 2d 
Reformation of Instruments §12 (1973). 
The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment make no 
mention of mutual mistake nor do they mention unilateral 
mistake and fraud. These doctrines were ignored by the 
Court. Reformation was declared simply because in the 
CoLtrt 's vic\v, Plaintiffs either did not understand or did 
not agree with the terms of the document they signed though 
they knew its nature. 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II THERF: WAS N;J EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
FHJDING MUTUAL MISTAKE OR lltlILAmr 
MISTAKE AND FRAUD. -
Even if it is assumed that the Court's findin~ 
and conclusion were based on the correct legal doctrines, 
(though unstated in the pleadings) there is no evidenc:_ to 
support those doctrines; there is in fact substantial contra: 
evidence. 
Mutual Mistake 
At the outset, it is clear that any mistake was 
not mutual. Mr. Smith knew the nature and import of the 
interest provision. T 116:28 - 117:1 It was stipulated that 
he informed Hr. Carter to draft that provision. T 117: 29 - I 
Unilateral Mistake and Fraud 
While the record clearly shows Mr. Thompson's 
suspicions were aroused, it may be that he still did not 
understand the interest provision after he signed the agree-
ment and left the bank, and that he labored under a uni-
lateral mistake. 
Hm1ever, there is no evidence to show fraud or anj 
misconduct on Mr. Smith's part. Thompson's testimony ~ 
He mentions Smith stating anything deceptive at the bank. 
knew Smith's position. If Thompson was misled, it 1vas by 
the bo.n~c officer, Mr. Nackos. Under direct examination hy 
his counsel Thompson states something cau[;ht his eye uhik 
arguing with Smith about th'-' clo;m paymeLlt: 
6 d 
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A. Durini this process, I just 3lance sideways, 
or just gl~nced at the amount, the amount printed 
in the contract concerning interest. 
Q. What caught your eye in that regard? 
A. Hell, the standard contract, approximately a 
sentence and a half, eight percent per annum on 
unpaid balance, and that is what it was, and the 
quantity that was in there. 
Q. What did you see regarding interest? 
A. I didn't read it at that time; I was ar gui,1g 
with him, with Hr. Sl'lith. I turned the paper and 
I said, "Nick, there looks like something -- Mr. 
Nackos, it looks as if something is wrong there on 
the interest." As we continued talking about 
this. I finally agreed to the 6,500, to make a 
long story short. T 25:29 - 26:13 
* * * * 
Q. Then what occurred after that, after you 
made that agreement? 
A. 11!:. Nackos attempted to get hold of Allan 
Carter, Mr. Carter. 
Q. Do you know for what reason? 
A. To clarify this. 
Q. What do you mean by "clarify this"? 
A. This is my assumption, clarify the interest 
set up here, what it meant. T 26:28 - 27:6 
* * -!: * 
Q. (By Mr. Foremaster) So then what occurred 
after this attempt to get ahold of Mr. Carter on 
the part of Mr. Nackos? 
TUE COURT: What happened? 
Q. (By Mr. Foremaster) What happened? 
A. He went through it again. 
Q. What do you mean by "went through it," what 
did he do? 
7 
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A. lie studi_1'd it. 
Q. Then what occurred? 
A. Here again, it's hard for me to kr=co uithir 
thP Judge's --
Q. No, you are all right. 
to you? 
Did anyone say anythi, 
A. My recollection was, that he said that it 
would be all right, that the first year 1:1as --it 
would be all right from then on. 
O. Now, ,/ho said that to you? 
A. Mr. Nackos. T 28:11 - 29 
See also Mrs. Thompson's corrohorating testimony 
at T 95:28 - 96:8. Both Plaintiffs testified that 
they were aware of the ?roblem. 
And the Court specifically found Thompsons were 
aware of the interest problem; that there was a dispute. 
13. That on March 29, 1977 at the meeting in the 
office of Nick liackos at Zions ?irs t Natio:i'-'l fL1'< 
in Hurricane, Utah between the parties, the contrac'. 1 
was read to the parties, and some discussion 113.s 
had rega:::din;; the payment of provisions for interesc 
as cal led for thereby as the same was difficult if 
not imoossible for the Plaintiffs to understand or 
for th~ bank officer to understand. 
14. That pursuant to said negotiation, the parties 
attempted to contact Allan C'lrter, the preo,:n:2r o'. 
said a;:;reernent, to ask hi111 to expL1in the terT'ls 
and conditions of sa:i.d contract as it uertained to 
interest, hmvever it was f1)und imrJossible to 
contact Al L1'1 Carte::-, and th·:::!refo"!:°e the provi:.io1s 
of said contract re(';arcling the payment o[ interest 
was not explained by the preparer of the agrceme'1L 
Findings of Fact '111 13, 14. 
It is important to note that the Court found only 
that the provision "was not explain2d hy the prcp:nc>r." 
There is no findin.c; as to Mr. Thornp;;on 's unclerstanc!ir·~ M 
Mr. l'lackos' explanation. 1>fl1ile c:1refully avoitiinf' 1 n:r 
8 
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st;i1-._,rnt:'nt that he "ci_dvised" the Thompsons (see T 54: 27 -
'.J'.i:'l; 6.S:'Uf - 69:li'f) lTr. Uackos stated he understood it and 
que:.tioned Tho,npsons about it. T 64:28 - 65:6. ThoG1psons 
stated Uackos advised them. T 28: 11-29. The T}1onpsons 
testified they just wanted to sign and get out of there, 
even though they did not understand it. T 98:7-20. 
Even allowing for interpretation of the ambiguous 
evidence to support a finding of unilateral mistake by 
Thompsons it is clear that Mr. Smith did not lie to llr. 
Thompson; nor did he conceal the nature of the provision. 
He was guilty of no misconduct. There is no evidence in the 
record to establish any inequitable conduct on his part. 
POINT III THOMPSONS WERE GUILTY OF 
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. 
A basic principle of the reformation doctrine is 
that reformation will be denied to one guilty of inexcusable 
negligence in executing an instrument. 
In Smith v. Whit law, 268 P. 2d 1031 (Colo. 1954) a 
corporation president sought to escape personal liability on 
a contract, though he was named personally as purchaser. He 
claimed that the corporate attorney, in revising the for~ 
presented by the seller, failed to delete personal references, 
and that the seller was aware that the purchase was corporate, 
not personal. 
The Colorado Court reviewed the evidence and 
stat~d the applicable law. 
9 
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...... 
A study of tre testimony briefly SUIT10.<Hi_,,er 
herein clearly discloses that there was no mutu,i] 
mistake made by both Sc1ith and H2ndrick:->0;1 in t!" 1 
matter of the capacity of the parties; and ilCce:i~'·i 
Srriith' s and his attorney's testinv:rny, at hest it-- I 
would be only a unilateral mistake on the Dart of 
Smith, and further, there is no fraud or wroncrfu1 
conduct disclosed in the evidence on the part~£ 
Hendrickson. It further is shown that Eendricksoo 
fully complied with every part of the ocntrilct. 
It must be remembered that Smith had an oppori:unit': 
to read the second and final draft of the coritract. 
but neglected to do so . . ' 
... In the case of Muchow v. Central City Gold 
Mines Co., 100 Colo. 58, 65 P.2d 702, our Court, 
in effect, said that a contract, such as is no1 
before us, will not be reformed on the ground of 
mistake at the instance of the party who prep8.red 
it when it appears that his alleged lack of knowlec 
was due to his failure to exercise reasonable 
diligence; and further, that equity will not 
relieve a party from the ill effects of a contract 
voluntarily executed, on the r;round of mutual . 
mistake, ,;here he could have been fully advised by I 
the exercise of reasonable diligence. 268 P.2d at I 
1034, 1035 ' 
Admittedly, each case must be decided upon its mm i 
facts. However, some similarities must be noted. 
Thompsons were aware of the interest provision; 
aware at least th.'!t they did not understand it and mvare 
that it did not mean eight per cent per annum. They e::ecutei 
the document fully aware of these factors, too:, the down 
payment, were relieved of the obligation of the Severson 
contract and only later changed their minds. 
Their actions, viewed objectively, establish their , 
acquiescence and agreement, barring any claim for relief. 
10 
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'I 
I 
L, 
'i 
I I 
I 
CONCLUS IOtl THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE ENFORCED 
AS \'TRITTEN 
While Thompsons acted quickly to correct their 
mi.stci.ke, they did not act -- or refuse to act -- quickly 
enough. They should have refused to sign at the closing 
rather than acquiesce, sign and file suit. 
Mr. Smith is guilty of no reprehensible conduct; 
rather, he made a proposal which reduced his total liability 
eliminating additional years of payments. Thompsons were 
aware, accepted, but reconsidered. Their reconsideration 
should not be allowed at his expense. 
Respectfully Submitted March 10, 1980. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
J /1--z;;t: I hereby certify that on the L.fL.__ day of March, 
1980, I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
on Phillip L. Foremaster Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, addressed to 494 East 
Tabernacle, St. George, Utah, 84770. 
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